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This review essay examines recent work in political theory on the ethics of immigration admis-  
sions.  It  considers  arguments  put  forward  by  Michael  Walzer,  Peter  Meilaender  and  David  
Miller, among others, for state control of borders. Such arguments tend to appeal to the value  
of  political  communities  and/or  the  exclusion  rights  of  democratic  associations,  and  I  argue  
that neither of these are successful. Turning to work by Joseph Carens, Phillip Cole, Michael  
Dummett and others who advocate open or much more open borders, the article considers  
various  arguments  that  would  support  this  stance,  including  appeals  to  freedom  of  move-  
ment, utilitarianism and social justice. I argue that rights to immigration need embedding in  
global principles of resource redistribution. In the conclusion I sketch a cosmopolitan approach  
to  immigration  by  which  impartial  criteria  such  as  population  density  and  gross  domestic  
product would determine how many migrants states have a duty to admit.  
No  one  knows  how  many  millions  of  people  migrate  each  year.  Figures  are  
indefinite  because  states  record  ﬂows  in  different  ways  and  because  of  illegal  
migration  (Ghosh,  2000a,  p.  6;  Stalker,  2001,  p.  10).  The  United  Nations  (UN)  
estimated  that  in  2002  there  were  185  million  migrants  in  the  world  or  about  
3 percent of the global population (Castles and Miller, 2003, p. 4).  1 Mass migra-  
tion  has  been  much  investigated  by  political  scientists,  sociologists,  lawyers,  
geographers,  economists  and  historians,  but  not  by  political  theorists,  who,  
despite  about  15  years  of  normative  work  on  the  multiculturalism  migration  
so  often  causes,  have  in  the  main  oddly  bypassed  the  logically  prior  question  
of what rights migrants have to enter a new state. Here I examine recent work  
that  redresses  this  omission.  The  principle  of  open  borders  has  been  strongly  
defended.  2  Others  argue  along  similarly  cosmopolitan  lines  for  more  open  
borders.  3  There  are  also  prominent  advocates  of  border  controls.  4  There  is  
something  of  an  emerging  research  agenda  on  the  ethics  of  immigration.  
 
Migration has a complex character. Categories of migrants include permanent  
settlers, contract workers, students, refugees, a nomadic global elite, as well as  
those  rejoining  their  families,  forcibly  transported  or  returning  to  their  home  
country (Stalker, 2001, pp. 10-2). The great majority of the world's population  
who  do  not  migrate  remain  profoundly  affected  by  it  through  the  receipt  of  
emigrants'  remittances  (a  fair  proportion  of  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  in  
many   sending   states),   new   competition   over   jobs   and   living   space,   ethnic  
conﬂict,   and   so   on   (Stalker,   2001,   pp.   100-12;   Castles   and   Miller,   2003,  
pp.  32-48,  178-97,  220-77).  Rational  choice  explanations  for  migration  focus  
on  'push  factors'  (such  as  poverty  or  population  growth)  by  which  individuals  
decide  to  leave  their  homes  and  'pull  factors'  (such  as  jobs  and  higher  living  
standards)   that   draw   them   elsewhere;   by   contrast,   structuralist   paradigms  
explain  migration  through  globalised  labour  markets  and  richer  states'  and  
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firms'   economic   power   (Stalker,   2001,   pp.   20-39;   Castles   and   Miller,   2003,  
pp. 21-32). Migration problematises the very notion of state membership, with  
much  attention  now  focused  on  transnational  communities  -  'a  new  type  of  
social  space'  (Stalker,  2001,  p.  115;  Castles  and  Miller,  2003,  pp.  29-30;  Jordan  
and Düvell, 2003, pp. 75-8) - that exist between states rather than within them  
such  as  the  circular  migration  between  the  US  and  Mexico  (compare  Johnson,  
2003). This complexity, moreover, is increasing. Not just the volume of migrants,  
but also the number of sending countries, is rising; a globalised economy means  
proximity;  shared  history  or  cultural  affinity  are  by  no  means  the  sole  expla-  
nations for migrants' choice of destination (there are new social networks such  
as migrant traffickers); and hence the cultural background, economic skills and  
social  attitudes  of  those  entering  rich  states  is  diversifying  too  (Ghosh,  2000a,  
pp.  8-14,  18-20;  Castles  and  Miller,  2003,  pp.  7-14,  122-53,  278-91).  Human  
rights  infringements,  environmental  degradation  and  deepening  inequalities  
are  all  gaining  salience  as  push  factors  from  developing  states.  Domestic  poli-  
tics,  state  security  and  regional  relationships  are  all  increasingly  affected  by  
migration.  
 
I  will  have  to  gloss  over  this  complexity.  Following  most  of  the  literature  I  
examine, I shall consider mainly economic migrants, not refugees (or other cat-  
egories  such  as  forced  migrants).  The  majority  of  the  world's  migrants  move  
for  economic  or  economic-related  reasons  such  as  family  reunification.  Only  
about 15 million of the 185 million migrants in 2002 were refugees (Castles and  
Miller  2003,  pp.  4-5).  To  be  sure,  that  proportion  may  rise.  Bell  (2004),  for  
example,  has  highlighted  the  phenomenon  of  environmental  refugees  whose  
numbers may grow significantly in the future. Moreover, one could destabilise  
the   distinction   between   political   refugees   and   many   economic   migrants  
through  an  argument  that  both  groups  suffer  from  states'  failures  to  provide  
for peoples basic needs like security and welfare (Shacknove, 1985). Neverthe-  
less,  there  is  some  distinction  to  be  had,  and  because  I  believe  refugees  raise  
distinct,  albeit  critical,  claims  of  justice,  I  shall  not  focus  on  them  here.  5  I  shall  
also be concerned principally with the basic right to enter and reside in a new  
state, not the subsequent question of admission to citizenship, although there  
are,  I  believe,  strong  grounds  in  justice,  to  extend  citizenship  rights  swiftly  to  
those  granted  the  right  to  reside.6  
 
The  guiding  framework  of  this  article  is  cosmopolitan.  Cosmopolitan  justice  
(stipulatively defined) concerns the principles governing the fair distribution of  
basic burdens and benefits that people suffer or enjoy; all the people who may  
be affected by a putative principle. Immigration controls involve considerations  
of  justice  because  they  plainly  greatly  affect  people's  life  chances  (compare  
O'Neill,  1994;  Lichtenberg,  1981;  Ottonelli,  2002;  Coleman  and  Harding,  1995,  
pp.  38-40;  Moellendorf,  2002,  pp.  30-9).  Benhabib,  by  contrast,  argues  that  
'migration   rights   cannot   be   subsumed   under   distributive   justice   claims'  
(Benhabib,  2004,  p.  72;  compare  Walzer,  1983,  p.  61).  Her  two  reasons  for  
this  claim  are,  first,  that  our  globalised  world  is  not  quite  the  'system  of  co-  
operation'   to   which   principles   of   justice   properly   apply   (although   it   does  
contain  'significant  interdependencies'),  and  second,  that  global  principles  of  
justice  may  not  be  compatible  with  democratic  self-governance  (Benhabib,  
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2004,  pp.  95-105).  Certainly,  just  principles  of  migration  must  include  a  space  
for  people's  democratic  decision-making,  but  I  would  rather  interpret  this  as  
part of the internal complexity of justice (where the results of a people's delib-  
eration  must  be  justified  to  all  those  affected)  than  see  the  task  as  one  of  
'reconciling  democratic  politics  with  global  egalitarian  aspirations'  (Benhabib,  
2004,  p.  102;  compare  Van  Parijs,  1993,  pp.  140-52).  The  first  point  supports  a  
view  of  justice  where  the  grounds  of  principles  are  the  effects  of  people's  
actions  upon  each  other  (Benhabib,  2004,  p.  97).  Although  correct,  this  view  
seems  unduly  restrictive.  Justice  also  concerns  what  we  can  do  for  others,  
whether they have previously been affected by our acts or omissions, and what  
we ought to do for fellow members of our common humanity. There is not the  
space to defend this view here, but, if correct, it would offer powerful reasons  
for subsuming immigration controls under principles of justice, over and above  
the causal contribution that rich states make to poorer people's desire to leave  
their  countries  of  origin.  
 
The  next  section  of  this  essay  discusses  arguments  for  state  sovereignty  in  
matters  of  border  control.  On  the  view  of  justice  I  have  defended,  such  argu-  
ments must also morally engage those prevented from entering. Cosmopolitan  
arguments   urge   more   open   borders   than   immigrants   currently   enjoy   on  
grounds of free movement as a principle of great moral weight - one popular  
argument - or on welfarist grounds of social justice - the other main argument.  
I  analyse  these  in  the  section  after  next.  I  conclude  by  brieﬂy  sketching  a  cos-  
mopolitan  argument  that  tries  to  integrate  global  redistributive  justice  with  
the value of democratic associations and citizens' special duties to one another.  
Arguments for State Control of Borders  
Popular arguments for states' right to control the entry of immigrants raise the  
dangers  of  overpopulation;  welfare  tourism;  social  disorder,  crime  and  terror-  
ism;  threats  to  cultural  homogeneity;  and  job  losses  and  wage  depression  
for   the   indigenous   working   population   (Hudson,   1984;   Meilaender,   2001,  
pp. 27-30; Harris, 2002, pp. 42-75). Empirically speaking, many of these dangers  
are  more  apparent  than  real.  They  are  vigorously  criticised  by  Harris  (2002;  
compare Hayter, 2000). There is a near academic consensus that migration tends  
to  improve  the  states'  economies,  for  example  (as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  
section).  Normatively  speaking,  migration  sceptics  tend  to  assume,  but  not  
argue  for,  the  collective  right  of  states  to  determine  admissions  criteria.  What  
might  ground  that  right?  
 
The  best  starting  point  here  is  Walzer's  defence  of  membership  restrictions  in  
Spheres  of  Justice  (1983).  Although  dated,  it  remains  much  cited  in  recent  
literature  (for  example,  Cole,  2000,  pp.  60-85;  Meilaender,  2001,  pp.  155-70;  
Benhabib, 2004, pp. 109-14), and Walzer still endorses his conclusions (Walzer,  
2003,  pp.  203-4).  Walzer's  discussion  is  rich,  allusive,  subtle  and  meandering,  
resisting   analytical   deconstruction.   However,   one   general   consideration   he  
offers is that the very idea of distributive justice presupposes a bounded politi-  
cal community of which some people are members and others are not (Walzer,  
1983,  p.  31).  Political  communities  should  retain  a  right  of  closure  in  order  to  
 320  JONATHAN  SEGLOW  
be communities, the critical pre-requisite for justly distributing social goods to  
members.  By  contrast,  the  prior  question  of  acquiring  membership  of  a  politi-  
cal  community  'is  not  pervasively  subject  to  the  constraints  of  justice'  (Walzer,  
1983,  p.  61).  In  effect,  then,  migrants  have  no  claim  in  justice  for  admission  
(Moellendorf,  2002,  p.  62;  compare  Benhabib,  2004,  pp.  95-105).  People  who  
want to emigrate from poor state A to richer state B have to rest content that  
A  too  has  the  right  to  exclude.  As  I  have  suggested,  this  seems  an  arbitrarily  
restrictive view of justice if we assume that every person has equal moral worth.  
But Walzer's discussion is a nuanced one. Thus, in discussing the ethics of admit-  
ting  refugees  and  poverty-stricken  'necessitous  strangers',  he  also  advances  
a  principle  of  mutual  aid  that  plainly  intrudes  upon  a  political  community's  
collective right to decide on admissions (Walzer, 1983, pp. 46-51). Moreover, in  
criticising  the  'White  Australia'  policy  by  which  the  Australian  government  
overtly discriminated against non-white would-be migrants, Walzer introduces  
population  density  as  a  further  criterion  of  the  justice  of  admission:  white  
Australians'  desire  to  preserve  the  'great  empty  spaces  of  the  subcontinent'  
was unjust (especially as their ancestors had coercively cleared those spaces of  
the aboriginal population) (1983, pp. 46-8). It would be unjust for Australia to  
keep  out  non-white  necessitous  strangers,  whatever  its  citizens'  views  on  the  
matter.  
 
Having  said  all  that,  the  main  thrust  of  Walzer's  position  on  immigration  is  to  
assert  the  value  of  democratic  sovereignty  over  the  claims  of  global  justice.  
Walzer's  general  argument  for  communitarian  justice  is  that  the  meanings  of  
goods  differs  radically  between  different  political  communities.  But  do  they  
always?  Of  course,  membership  of  Japanese  society  means  something  differ-  
ent  than  membership  of  American  society.  But  the  general  concept  of  mem-  
bership  is  pretty  much  shared,  as  it  surely  must  be  if  one  wants  to  advance  a  
view  of  justice  that  obtains  within  a  bounded  political  community  of  which  
only  some  people  are  members.  Alternatively,  Walzer  might  claim  that  justice  
without the means of enforcement is no justice at all, merely an abstract hope.7  
Further, he could argue that the conventionally sovereign state offers the best  
such means of enforcement. These claims would require some elaboration (see  
Walzer,  1995).  
 
In  the  most  often  cited  passage  in  the  chapter  on  membership,  Walzer  makes  
a  tangential  suggestion:  
 
Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence.  
They  suggest  the  deepest  meaning  of  self-determination.  Without  
them, there could not be communities of character, historically stable,  
ongoing  associations  of  men  and  women  with  some  special  commit-  
ment  to  one  another  and  some  special  sense  of  their  common  life  
(Walzer,  1983,  p.  62).  
 
There  seem  to  be  two  considerations  here.  There  is  a  communitarian  claim  
about the overriding value of political societies possessing a certain character:  
a  historical  cluster  of  particular  values,  tradition  and  practice.  Plainly,  large  
numbers  of  aliens  would  challenge  that  character.  Informing  this  reading  is  
Walzer's  likening  of  political  communities  to  families  (1983,  pp.  41-2).  Here,  
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then,  we  have  an  academic  rendering  of  the  prejudice  that  a  mass  inﬂux  of  
immigrants  would  swamp  our  way  of  life.  The  reason  why  justice  should  exist  
largely within and not between states is the overriding values of a cultural com-  
munity  identified  with  the  nation  state  (multinational  states  would  seem  to  
raise  difficulties  for  the  argument).  However,  alongside  the  family  analogy,  
Walzer offers an alternative metaphor and a different claim: political societies  
are  like  clubs  or  associations  (1983,  pp.  40-1).  This  supports  a  second  reading.  
No longer bound by an imperative to preserve, club members have the freedom  
to decide who is privileged to be admitted. The prize value now is democratic  
self-determination; the resulting society may be plural and diverse. By contrast,  
the  first,  argument  about  cultural  preservation,  need  not  involve  any  special  
commitment  to  democracy.  I  shall  call  the  first  argument  the  communitarian  
argument  and  the  second  the  democratic  association  argument  and  consider  
them  in  turn.  
 
No  serious  writer  defends  the  communitarian  argument  simpliciter.  Neverthe-  
less, Meilaender's (2001) recent book defending immigration restrictions some-  
times  comes  close.  Meilaender  believes  that  Walzer's  view  of  immigration  is  
'essentially correct' (2001, p. 163). '[S]tates are entitled, within certain limits, to  
craft immigration policies as they see fit, based upon their particular histories,  
cultures,  interests  and  desires'  (2001,  p.  1).  The  more  immigration  policies  are  
based  on  states'  history  and  culture,  the  more  we  approach  the  communitar-  
ian argument (which in its pure form would claim that states are mandated to  
preserve their particular cultures). By contrast, the more states can craft immi-  
gration  policies  based  on  whatever  criteria  they  deem  appropriate,  the  more  
we  approach  the  democratic  association  argument.  In  communitarian  vein,  
Meilaender   suggests   that   confronted   with   strangers   wanting   admission,   a  
people  are  entitled  to  ask  themselves  questions  about  their  political  identity  
and   are   entitled   not   to   welcome   migrants   who   would   threaten   it   (2001,  
pp.  81-2).  More  than  Walzer,  Meilaender's  position  is  motivated  by  threats  to  
a  state's  political  culture  and  institutions.  That  may  seem  to  found  a  rather  
weaker defence of restrictions, if any at all: immigration will more likely change  
our   shared   culture   than   our   legal   and   political   institutions.   Meilaender,  
however, sees no sharp division between political culture and culture more gen-  
erally,  a  claim  which  surely  has  more  plausibility  for  non-liberal  rather  than  
liberal societies. Indeed, he maintains that liberalism is not the only legitimate  
way of life, given subscription to certain minimum moral standards - these are  
his 'certain limits' above (2001, pp. 5-7). Political cultures provide stable context  
needed  for  persons  to  develop,  and  they  can  contain  ideas  and  traditions  of  
universal  worth.  
 
There  is  much  to  say  in  reply  to  the  communitarian  argument.  First,  how  far  
migration  affects  a  society's  character  depends  on  many  factors:  how  many  
migrants  enter  (borders  that  are  not  closed  need  not  be  borders  completely  
open), where the migrants come from and states' population densities to name  
just   some.   Second,   if   a   society's   character   is   multicultural   then   preserving  
it  would  hardly  licence  restrictions  on  immigration  from  those  states  where  
constituent  cultures  originate  (compare  Bader,  1995,  pp.  217-21;  Perry,  1995,  
pp. 121-4; Gans, 1998). Third, national cultures change over time. There is the  
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daily  production  of  a  shared  life  world  (O'Neill,  1994,  pp.  75-7;  Meilaender,  
2001, p. 163). However, if cultures change, where go those certain features that  
yield the normative authority to support the right to exclude? Cultures are not  
like  paintings  to  be  framed  and  preserved.  Fourth,  just  because  a  culture  has  
a character does not mean it has value: character is a claim about distinctness:  
each  snowﬂake  has  its  'character'  because  it  is  different  from  all  the  others.  
Could  not  an  inﬂux  of  migrants  augment  the  value  of  a  nation's  culture,  
through   offering   new   ways   of   life   that   come   into   contact   with   the   old  
(Benhabib,  2004,  p.  86;  compare  Hudson,  1984,  pp.  212-8)?  
 
So  much  is  familiar  to  anti-communitarians.  More  interesting  is  the  democra-  
tic association argument. Following Walzer, Meilaender also points to an essen-  
tial interest in democracy between free and equal people (2001, p. 167). Brian  
Barry has stated bluntly that '[i]t is a general characteristic of associations that  
people  are  free  to  leave  them  but  not  free  to  join  them'  (Barry,  1992,  p.  284).  
Is  the  state  an  association  with  this  right?  If  'general'  means  universal,  then  
Barry's  claim  is  incorrect.  While  often  true  of  clubs,  the  right  to  refuse  admis-  
sion  is  not  generally  true  of  associations.  Having  the  qualifications,  I  would  
have  had  reason  to  regard  it  as  unjust  had  my  application  to  the  Association  
of  University  Teachers  been  denied.  More  crucially,  most  associations  operate  
in  the  private  sphere,  where  our  intuitions  about  freedom  of  association  are  
at  their  strongest  and  where  the  goods  denied  to  outsiders  (golf  club  mem-  
bership,  for  instance)  are  not  always  vital.  States,  by  contrast,  help  constitute  
the public domain, where goods are more basic and hence impartiality is more  
critical (Ackerman, 1980, pp. 341-6; compare White, 1997). It is the state from  
which  we  seek  ultimate  recognition  of  our  freedom  and  equality  (Ackerman,  
1980,  p.  93).  Associations  typically  seek  to  deny  outsiders  goods  available  to  
members  (Coleman  and  Harding,  1995,  pp.  25-34;  Jordan  and  Düvell,  2003,  
pp.  34-5).  The  associationist  analogy  draws  much  of  its  appeal  from  the  fact  
that  outsiders  remain  entitled  to  basic  goods  by  the  state.  Hence,  the  state  is  
one  institution  against  which  the  analogy  cannot  be  pressed.  
 
Appealing  directly  to  the  value  of  states,  David  Miller  maintains  that  citizens  
have  a  basic  interest  in  controlling  their  culture  and  shaping  it  according  to  
their  judgement  (Miller,  2005,  pp.  199-200).  They  are  entitled  to  judge  which  
elements  of  their  public  culture  are  worth  preserving  (their  language,  for  
instance)  and  which  may  be  developed  and  adapted  to  suit  changed  circum-  
stances.  This  is  the  democratic  association  argument  with  a  communitarian  
twist. However, Miller gives a robust defence in justice to non-admitted would-  
be  migrants  who  would  lose  by  such  a  policy.  Every  autonomous  person  has  a  
legitimate  interest  in  an  adequate  range  of  life  options  to  choose  between  
(Miller,  2005,  p.  196).  However,  provided  your  own  state  provides  you  with  an  
adequate range, you have no basic interest in being able to migrate to another  
state.  Such  an  interest  is  less  vital  than  a  people's  interest  in  controlling  their  
political  association.  
 
Miller's  last  point  seems  less  relevant  when  one  considers  that  most  migrants  
do  not  move  in  pursuit  of  Millian,  'experiments  in  living',  but  simply  in  order  
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to improve their economic welfare. Be that as it may, how wide a range of life  
options  is  'adequate'?  If  one  person  wants  to  be  a  hunter,  a  fisherman  and  a  
critic  but  another  is  content  merely  to  hunt  and  fish,  then  should  we  encour-  
age the latter to take up a little criticising, or do we reprimand the former for  
having  an  expensive  taste?  Different  states  offer  wider  or  narrower  ranges  of  
options; people living in a fairly homogenous society might have a basic inter-  
est  in  migrating  that  citizens  in  a  more  pluralistic  one  would  not.  
 
Miller has a further argument. Open borders would give developing countries  
an  interest  in  'exporting'  their  surplus  populations  to  the  rest  of  the  world  
(Miller,  2005,  pp.  201-2).  The  right  to  close  borders  helps  forestall  that  possi-  
bility. This raises questions about how responsible a poor state's people are for  
their high population growth (perhaps richer states share some responsibility?)  
(compare  Miller,  2004).  
 
Miller's   arguments   around   democratic   association,   adequate   options   and  
overpopulation  appeal  to  a  common  intuition:  a  people's  social  infrastructure  
should be able to satisfy their basic interests; hence (refugees aside), immigra-  
tion   is   rarely   a   claim   in   justice.   In   a   few   remarks   in   The   Law   of   Peoples  
Rawls elaborates on this assumption (Rawls, 1999, pp. 8-9, 38-9). A state's ter-  
ritory,  however  arbitrary  its  origin,  is  its  people's  collective  asset  or  property  
(compare  Kymlicka,  2001,  pp.  265-7;  O'Neill,  1994,  pp.  70,  85-6).  In  a  'realistic  
utopia'   (absent   wars,   persecutions,   famines   and   so   on),   a   territory   should  
be  able  to  support  its  people  in  perpetuity.  Pressure  to  emigrate  can  only  
mean  that  a  people  has  not  sufficiently  taken  care  of  its  territorial  asset.  
However,  the  burden  of  their  irresponsibility  cannot  be  shifted  onto  others  
without their consent. In a realistic utopia peoples' territories can support them  
in  perpetuity  and  problem  levels  of  immigration  would  be  eliminated.  Until  
then,   states   that   are   more   fortunate   have   duties   of   assistance   towards  
'burdened  societies'.  
 
In  connecting  a  people  with  their  unique  place,  Rawls  seems  to  return  us  to  
the  communitarian  argument  (indeed  he  explicitly  endorses  Walzer  (Rawls,  
1999, p. 39, note 48)). Most states have diverse peoples, not a singular people:  
what  distinguishes  them  is  a  common  set  of  legal  and  political  institutions  
(compare  Benhabib,  2004,  pp.  78-80).  The  cogency  of  Miller's  and  Rawls's  
assumption  that  a  state  should  meet  its  people's  interests  turns  in  part  on  
whether  we  regard  migration  as  exceptional  -  only  a  small  minority  of  the  
world's population migrates even in an open-borders regime like the European  
Union  (EU)  -  or  the  norm  -  migration  has  been  endemic  throughout  human  
history and created states like the present USA. A neutral liberalism of the kind  
Rawls  once  espoused  that  might  try  to  achieve  some  impartiality  between  
would-be migrants and those who prefer sedentary lifestyles (compare Jordan  
and  Düvell,  2003,  p.  143).  Elsewhere  in  his  work  Rawls  appeals  to  the  norma-  
tive  ideal  of  free  and  equal  individuals  as  a  critical  lever  on  collective  social  
arrangements of which his reliance on peoples is also an instance (Rawls, 2001,  
pp.  18-24;  Benhabib,  2004,  pp.  82-4).  
 
The  democratic  association  argument,  advanced  in  different  ways  by  Walzer,  
Meilaender,  Miller  and  Rawls,  offers  a  moral  endorsement  for  the  way  immi-  
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gration   policy   currently   stands.   Unlike   open   borders,   it   does   not   foist   on  
receiving  states  an  ideal  far  removed  from  their  citizens'  actual  motivations.  
Moreover, democratic association is not just a practical reality; it is a normative  
ideal.  One  of  the  freedoms  that  free  and  equal  citizens  ought  to  have  is  the  
freedom  to  decide  on  matters  of  common  concern  with  their  fellow  citizens.  
The moral problem is when this collective freedom impacts upon the interests  
of  those  excluded  from  the  ambit  of  decision-making,  or  to  put  it  concretely,  
when immigration restrictions keep out those who would stand hugely to gain.  
I shall return to the tension between the ideals of democratic sovereignty and  
cosmopolitan  justice  in  the  conclusion.  
 
Arguments for Opening Borders  
If the chapter on membership in Spheres of Justice is the locus classicus for aca-  
demic  immigration  sceptics,  then  Joseph  Carens's  article  'Aliens  and  Citizens:  
The Case for Open Borders' (1987) is the point of departure for cosmopolitans.  
In  more  recent  work  Carens  has  distinguished  between  realistic  and  idealistic  
approaches   to   the   ethics   of   immigration   (1994,   pp.   143-52;   1996;   1999,  
pp. 1084-6; 2001, pp. 17-29; 2003, p. 95), and remained doggedly attached to  
the principle of open borders as an ideal towards which we should strive (1992;  
1994,  pp.  149-50;  1999,  p.  1083;  2001,  pp.  28-34).  In  his  1987  article  Carens  
sought  to  recruit  an  overlapping  consensus  for  open  borders  by  suggesting  
that,  once  interpreted  consistently,  Rawlsian,  Nozickian,  utilitarian  and  even  
Walzer's  communitarian  arguments  would  all  support  it.  Walzerian  reasoning  
supports open borders because principles of freedom and equality are a deeply  
rooted  part  of  our  tradition.  The  early  Rawls  focus  on  the  least  advantaged  
would  mean  that  parties  behind  his  original  position  would  licence  the  right  
to  immigrate  as  a  basic  liberty  (compare  Whelan,  1988,  pp.  7-11;  Kymlicka,  
2001, p. 267). The distribution of borders across the world is, after all, arbitrary  
from  a  moral  point  of  view.  Because  Nozickian  individuals  have  unfettered  
freedom  to  control  their  own  property,  there  is  no  moral  basis  for  the  state  
to exclude migrants. Utilitarians would likewise support open borders because  
the  consensus  is  that  both  migrants  and  established  citizens  make  economic  
gains.  
 
Libertarian  approaches  to  immigration  have  not  excited  the  interest  of  many  
besides  its  converts  (Steiner,  1992;  compare  Cole,  2000,  pp.  154-60).  While  
Carens  points  out  that  states  would  lack  the  moral  authority  to  keep  im-  
migrants   out,   this   authority   would   merely   pass   to   individual   or   corporate  
property-holders  whose  right  to  exclude  who  they  wish  is  absent    from  any  
requirement of public justification (1987, pp. 253-4). Libertarianism hardly sup-  
ports  open  borders.  Indeed,  as  Steiner  suggests,  property-holders'  absolute  
rights  to  their  territories  leaves  them  free  to  secede  from  their  state  and  join  
other owners to create new libertarian states (notwithstanding obstinate facts  
of  world  geography)  (Steiner,  1992,  pp.  92-4).  
 
In  this  section  I  focus  on  arguments  for  opening  borders  grounded  in  cos-  
mopolitan  appeals  to  social  justice.  Before  doing  so,  however,  let  me  consider  
a  distinct  cosmopolitan  argument,  namely  that  if  we  have  the  right  to  free  
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movement  then  we  have  the  right  to  immigrate  across  other  states'  borders  
(compare  Carens,  1992,  pp.  26-8;  Woodward,  1992,  pp.  60-4).  A  number  of  
writers endorse this argument. Carens himself refers to the 'important human  
right'  of  free  movement  (1999,  p.  1083;  compare  Kukathas,  2005,  p.  210)  and  
suggests that, barring reasons of national security, public order or the dangers  
of  a  large  inﬂux  of  people  with  anti-liberal  attitudes,  it  should  normally  be  
a presumption (Carens, 1992, pp. 28-31). Dummett similarly argued that there  
is  a  presumption  in  favour  of  individual  freedom,  barring  serious  overpopula-  
tion   or   complete   cultural   submergence   (Dummett,   2002,   pp.   57-72;   2004,  
pp.  117-18).  
 
At  a  tangent  to  this,  Cole  (2000)  seeks  to  show  the  incoherence  of  liberalism  
on  the  immigration  issue.  The  fundamental  principles  of  liberalism  regard  
people  as  free  and  equal,  and  liberals  criticise  states  that  fail  to  respect  these  
values in law. However, liberal states' attitudes to immigration reveal their lib-  
eralism  to  be  arbitrarily  restricted  in  scope:  entry  restrictions  mean  that  liber-  
alism 'comes to an end at the national border' (Cole, 2000, p. 13). Hence, 'there  
is no strategy of membership control that can be consistent with central liberal  
principles'   (2000,   p.   193).   Moreover,   Cole   stresses   the   asymmetry   between  
entry  and  exit.  That  emigration  restrictions  are  plainly  unjust  shows  our  deep  
commitment  to  the  principle  of  free  movement.  Restrictions  on  immigration  
are  therefore  anomalous  (Cole,  2000,  pp.  43-59;  compare  Carens,  1992.  p.  27;  
Miller,  2005,  pp.  196-7).  
 
This argument raises two issues of, first whether immigration centrally involves  
freedom  and,  second  how  freedom  is  best  conceptualised.  With  regard  to  the  
first  issue,  Kant,  in  his  Perpetual  Peace,  argued  for  a  right  to  free  movement  
based on humanity's common ownership of the earth, but he distinguished this  
'right  to  visit'  from  a  person's  'right  to  be  a  permanent  visitor'  in  a  new  state  
'which  would  require  a  special,  charitable  agreement  to  make  him  a  fellow  
inhabitant' (Kant, 1983, p. 118; compare Bauböck, 1994, p. 321; Perry, 1995, pp.  
106-10).  True,  the  right  to  reside  elsewhere  need  not  involve  the  acquisition  
of citizenship. But a new immigrant nonetheless participates in social and eco-  
nomic  institutions  alongside  the  indigenous  population  in  a  way  that  tourists,  
for  example,  do  not:  thus,  something  more  substantial  than  the  mere  free  
movement is involved in immigration (this is the insight of the communitarian  
and  democratic  association  arguments)  (Coleman  and  Harding,  1995).  On  the  
second  issue,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  freedom  of  movement  is  not  a  
simple  phenomenon.  Our  freedom  to  move  about  the  territory  of  our  own  
state  is  not  absolute  but  limited  by  others'  property  ownership  and  regulated  
by the state (for example, traffic control, mass demonstrations) (Miller 2005, p.  
195).  Further,  one  might  argue  that  free  movement  is  not  so  much  permitted  
by  state  institutions  as  enabled  by  them:  states  provide  roads,  railways,  public  
transport  and  so  on,  and  a  criminal  justice  system  to  ensure  citizens  can  move  
unharassed.  On  this  view,  it  would  be  a  substantive  moral  question  whether  
those  transnational  institutions  that  enable  movement  across  state  borders  
should  be  strengthened  to  empower  mass  migration.  Alternatively,  freedom  
might  be  identified  with  rights.  Is  there  an  absolute  right  to  free  movement  
across  state  boundaries?  If  rights  are  grounded  in  moral  interests  then  this  
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would depend on a judgement involving the interests of both immigrants and  
their hosts. Moreover, as several authors point out, many rights are conditional  
in  nature:  the  right  to  immigrate  might  be  like  the  right  to  marry;  one  has  to  
find  a  person  (state)  willing  to  take  one  (Barry,  1992,  pp.  280-3;  Miller,  2005,  
p.  197;  compare  Woodward,  1992).  
 
The   problems   around   the   two   issues   just   discussed   suggest   that,   however  
attractive  from  a  liberal  cosmopolitan  perspective,  it  is  problematic  to  argue  
for  open  borders  merely  through  an  appeal  to  free  movement.  We  do  better  
to turn to social justice.  8 This after all is the chief reason for most primary migra-  
tion:  people  move  to  improve  their  economic  well-being.  Social  justice  argu-  
ments  grounded  in  the  impartially  considered  interests  of  all  affected  parties  
have  been  popular  in  the  literature.  
 
Economistic  approaches  to  the  ethics  of  admission  have  often  defended  open  
borders.  In  part,  this  is  on  grounds  of  consistency:  if  the  free  market  means  
goods and capital can move around the world, then why not labour too (Barry  
and  Goodin,  1992)?  Indeed,  the  1957  Treaty  of  Rome  that  established  the  EU  
called  for  free  movement  of  labour  as  a  goal  to  be  achieved,  and  the  open-  
borders  regime  within  the  (established)  EU  states  today  has  primarily  been  
rooted   in   an   economic   conception   of   citizenship   (Kostakopoulou,   2001;  
Geddes,   2003).   In   the   main,   however,   this   is   a   quasi-utilitarian   argument:  
opening borders would make both migrants and indigenous populations better  
off.  9  Harris  claims  that  in  opening  borders  there  lies  '[p]erhaps  the  greatest  
opportunity  for  the  eradication  of  world  poverty'  (Harris,  2002,  p.  91).  Eco-  
nomic  migrants  escape  the  poverty  and  paucity  of  opportunity  at  home  and  
direct  their  talent  and  industry  to  where  they  can  be  put  to  better  use.  They  
receive higher wages in their countries of destination; they are keen, able and  
ready to work, often in low-paid jobs that locals are reluctant to do, or in dirty,  
difficult and dangerous occupations (Harris, 2002, pp. 76-81; Stalker, 2001, pp.  
23,  30-1;  Castles  and  Miller,  2003,  pp.  178-97).  Some  start  new  businesses  and  
thus  create  wealth  and  jobs.  All  of  them  are  new  consumers.  Highly  skilled  
migrants  such  as  doctors  or  CEOs  disproportionately  benefit  their  states  of  
destination.  Migrants  send  substantial  remittances  back  to  their  countries  of  
origin,  often  for  many  years  after  they  migrate  (Stalker,  2001,  pp.  107-12;  
Castles  and  Miller,  2003,  pp.  169-70).  This  is  not  quite  utilitarianism  because  
opening borders may not make migrants and their hosts as well off as they fea-  
sibly  might  be.  But  maximisation  aside,  the  focus  on  economic  well-being  
retains  much  of  utilitarianism's  ﬂavour.  
 
There  are  three  problems  with  the  quasi-utilitarian  argument:  (i)  it  is  contin-  
gent  on  the  costs  outweighing  the  benefits;  (ii)  it  neglects  the  distributional  
impact  of  migration;  and  (iii)  it  ignores  moral  considerations  that  utilitarians  
find  hard  to  accommodate  such  as  sovereignty  and  membership.  With  regard  
to  the  first  problem,  advocates  of  opening  borders  recognise  there  are  costs  
too.  Non-working  family  members  of  migrants  such  as  children  and  retired  
parents   impose   relative   burdens   on   receiving   states.   Economically   active   -  
sometimes  highly  skilled  -  citizens  who  leave  may  be  just  those  who  their  
sending  state  can  least  afford  to  do  without.  Once  they  have  arrived  in  the  
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receiving  country,  they  may  suffer  from  discrimination  and  marginalisation.  
Imperfect  information  and  non-optimal  markets  may  mean  that  migrants  do  
not  complement  but  compete  with  locals  for  the  same  sorts  of  jobs,  while  
labour  shortages  remain  (Kleinman,  2003,  pp.  61-2).  Plainly,  utilitarian  argu-  
ments   only   work   if   gains   consistently   outweigh   losses.   As   to   the   second  
problem, the distributional impact of migration, the very poorest people in the  
world do not migrate: they cannot afford to (Stalker, 2001, pp. 128-9; compare  
Ghosh,  2000a,  p.  11).  Remittances  sent  home  may  not  go  to  the  poorest  com-  
munities. While host countries enjoy a net gain from migration, it is quite likely  
to  be  their  less  well  off  citizens  who  compete  with  migrants  in  the  labour  
market or in the consumption of welfare. As to the third problem, a consistent  
utilitarian argument would need to show that open borders significantly raised  
non-economic  sources  of  well-being  (assuming  the  economic  gain  is  not  so  
great  it  would  outweigh  non-economic  losses).  Suppose,  with  the  communi-  
tarian  and  democratic  association  arguments,  that  a  people's  attachment  to  
their  own  society  is  a  legitimate  moral  consideration  (even  if  not  a  decisive  
one).  Utilitarianism  would  need  to  represent  this  as  a  complex  kind  of  associ-  
ational  preference  that  depended  on  others  having  preferences  of  a  similar  
sort. Further, the truth in the democratic association argument - that to avoid  
tyranny  and  effect  justice,  the  world  must  be  divided  into  units  within  which  
people  should  have  a  say  in  matters  affecting  them  (compare  O'Neill,  1994,  
pp.  71-5;  Whelan,  1988,  pp.  23-7;  Pogge,  2002,  pp.  168-95)  -  is  also  hard  for  
utilitarianism to model. Self-determination is a value sui generis, not a further  
source  of  well-being.  Only  a  diehard  utilitarian  would  be  happy  pursuing  a  
reductionist  strategy  on  these  diverse  moral  considerations.  
 
Dummett (2002, pp. 22-6), Cole (2000, pp. 198-202), Isbister (1996) and Carens  
(1992,  pp.  34-6;  1994,  pp.  144-50;  2001,  pp.  28-31)  in  writings  since  his  1987  
article all maintain that opening borders would help promote the global spread  
of   equal   opportunity.   Abolishing   border   controls   would   enable   far   larger  
numbers  of  people  to  travel  from  the  poor  world  to  the  rich  to  take  advan-  
tage  of  the  opportunities  there.  Up  to  a  point,  this  is  true  -  although  it  is  not  
an  argument  for  opening  borders  between  states  that  are  relatively  afﬂuent  
(compare  Carens,  1992,  pp.  36-40).  However,  that  policy  is  not  likely  to  meet  
all  the  demands  of  a  distributive  principle  such  as  equality  of  opportunity,  
equality  of  outcome  or  giving  priority  to  the  worse  off  (compare  Woodward,  
1992,  pp.  60-72;  Somek,  1998,  pp.  120-5;  Whelan,  1988,  pp.  10-12;  Tan,  2004,  
pp.  123-31).  The  first  problem  (i)  arising  from  the  quasi-utilitarian  argument  
and,  especially,  the  second  (ii)  remain  in  similar  form.  (Nor  do  distributivist  
arguments,  on  their  own,  do  much  to  address  the  issue  of  self-determination,  
which relates to the third problem (iii).) The problem with (ii) is that we do not  
usually  devolve  sole  responsibility  for  fulfilling  principles  of  social  justice  to  
agents   undirected   by   political   authorities.   Open   borders   permit   people   to  
move.  However,  a  state,  seeking  to  realise  equality  of  opportunity  within  its  
own  borders,  will  use  legal  and  policy  levers  to  direct  citizens  in  certain  ways  
(forbidding   job   discrimination,   for   example,   or   taxing   private   education).  
Opening  borders  would  certainly  further  some  people's  opportunities  -  those  
able  to  migrate  and  their  relatives  -  but  not  many  others  whose  interests  
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nonetheless come within the ambit of a global principle. Contradicting Harris,  
Bader   maintains   that   opening   borders   would   do   little   to   alleviate   global  
poverty  (Bader,  1997,  p.  29;  compare  Pogge,  1997).  
 
Several writers argue for principles of global redistributive justice that, if effec-  
tive, would forestall the need for mass migration.  10 Goodin and Bader suggest  
the current regime of fairly closed borders lacks moral legitimacy just because  
richer  states  fail  to  meet  their  human  rights  obligations  to  the  poor  (Goodin,  
1992, p. 8; Bader, 1997, p. 30). There are, in my view, two powerful reasons to  
prefer a global regime of redistributive social justice to open borders. First, for  
the  reasons  given  earlier,  redistribution  is  far  more  likely  to  be  an  effective  
agent  of  justice  than  mass  migration.  Second,  while  some  people  will  always  
want to strike out and make a new life abroad, the majority of migrants would  
prefer  to  enjoy  more  opportunities  in  their  countries  of  birth.  Lifting  immi-  
gration restrictions should not carry the load of addressing the maldistribution  
of  resources  and  opportunities  across  the  globe.  
 
In a just world, immigration would probably be less but would it, nonetheless,  
include more open borders? Kymlicka argues that 'if states do meet their oblig-  
ations of international justice, then it is permissible for them to regulate admis-  
sions so as [sic] preserve a distinct national community' (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 271).  
By contrast, Bader maintains that redistributive global justice is consistent with  
'fairly open borders' (Bader, 1997, pp. 36-8). But if states that meet their duties  
of global redistributive justice have only limited rights to control their borders  
- because they are only fairly open - then we need to know a bit more about  
which migrants such states do have a duty to admit before we can declare the  
two positions consistent. For example, there is a tension between the claim that  
afﬂuent  liberal  democracies  should  admit  poorer  migrants  and  Kymlicka's  cri-  
terion of preserving a distinct national community. Poor migrants mainly come  
from  poor  parts  of  the  world.  Admitting  large  number  of  poor  migrants  with  
ethno-cultural identities quite different from their host population is not likely  
to  preserve  the  distinctness  of  the  host's  national  community.11  Perhaps  rich  
states should substantially open their borders to immigrants from poorer states  
(to  whom  they  also  owe  weighty  duties  of  redistributive  justice)  while  impos-  
ing greater restrictions on immigration from equally afﬂuent states whose citi-  
zens  nonetheless  have  similar  collective  identities?12  As  Tan  puts  it,  '[B]order  
restrictions on the part of well-off countries can be justly maintained only in a  
context  of  a  global  arrangement  [of  distributive  justice]  that  those  kept  out  
can  reasonably  accept  as  reasonable'  (Tan,  2004,  p.  176).  
 
Jordan and Düvell's dense analysis of migration highlights the problem that, if  
borders  are  fairly  open  for  those  with  fortunate  economic  endowments,  they  
can sort themselves into new membership systems that impose very harsh con-  
ditions on the excluded (Jordan and Düvell, 2003, pp. 69-71, 97-8, 106). Those  
able to make substantial economic contributions can reap considerable rewards  
(capital and investment), while imposing harsh measures on vulnerable people  
left  outside  -  economic  rents  and  an  end  to  welfare  risk-pooling.  For  the  for-  
tunate  few,  political  communities  become,  like  associations,  objects  of  choice;  
for  the  majority  they  become  communities  of  fate  -  and  often  deprivation  
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(Jordan  and  Düvell,  2003,  p.  31).  Nevertheless,  just  principles  must  aim  at  a  
certain  kind  of  impartiality  between  the  sedentary  and  the  footloose.  Jordan  
and  Düvell's  solution  is  radical:  'the  whole  world's  population  should  get  a  
universal global basic income (GBI)' and 'each should be supplied with health,  
education,  and  other  social  services  through  systems  of  overlapping  clubs,  
regulated  at  the  regional  or  national  level'  (2003,  p.  140).  A  GBI  helps  tackle  
the  privileges  of  states  as  clubs.  Overlapping  authorities  help  risk-pooling,  
cost-sharing  and  other  forms  of  interdependence.  Much  of  this  could  be  con-  
tested.  A  universal  GBI  might  rather  restrict  state  sovereignty,  for  example  
(compare Jordan and Düvell, pp. 140-3). In addition, Jordan and Düvell's rather  
economistic   approach   to   migration,   I   think,   underplays   people's   communi-  
tarian  attachment  to  their  own  society.  Nevertheless,  their  work  is  a  bold  and  
impressive  synthesis  of  global  justice,  migratory  movements  and  the  value  of  
democratic  associations  in  a  single  coherent  position.  
Conclusion  
King wrote some years ago that 'trying to push this [immigration] issue inside  
a  particular  philosophical  frame  generates  rather  extreme  recommendations  
for policy' (King, 1983, p. 531). State control and open-borders arguments seem  
to  speak  past  each  other.  Notwithstanding  the  value  pluralism  often  said  irre-  
deemably  to  mark  contemporary  political  theorising,  I  believe  that  we  should  
try  -  following  Jordan  and  Düvell  and  Benhabib  -  to  incorporate  the  value  of  
democratic  associations  within  a  broadly  cosmopolitan  position  (Jordan  and  
Düvell,  2003;  Benhabib,  2004).  
 
Let  me  conclude  by  outlining  brieﬂy  one  possible  cosmopolitan  view  of  the  
ethics  of  immigration.  It  begins  with  an  abstract  normative  ideal  of  a  decent  
life  to  which  every  person  in  the  world  has  a  right.  A  decent  life  requires  
freedoms,  resources,  opportunities  and  particular  relationships  with  others,  
including one's fellow citizens. The idea of a decent life is a comparative notion  
so  that  person  A's  life  may  be  less  decent  just  because  person  B  enjoys  more  
resources,  opportunities  and  so  on  (compare  Feinberg,  1974).  Therefore,  in  
order to effect the right to a decent life of peoples living in the world's poorer  
states,  rich  states  need  to  redistribute  resources  and  opportunities  towards  
them.  As  I  have  suggested  already,  insofar  as  there  are  alternatives  we  should  
prefer global redistributive justice to open borders. To put it bluntly, it is better  
to shift resources to people, rather than permitting people to shift themselves  
towards  resources.  
 
Citizens - especially citizens in rich states - have powerful duties to help build  
a just global order, one in which all persons are able to lead decent lives. Once  
achieved,  this  need  not  include  completely  open  borders,  although  there  are  
good  reasons  -  not  least  to  encourage  the  spread  of  cosmopolitan  sentiment  
-  for  borders  to  be  more  open  than  they  currently  are.  Until  we  realise  that  
ideal,  and  perhaps  even  if  we  do,  rich  states  have  substantial  duties  to  admit  
poor outsiders. (And of course, we need criteria governing admissions policies  
for  poor  states  too.)  Schuck  has  interestingly  argued  for  a  system  of  refugee  
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burden-sharing  by  which  an  international  agency  would  distribute  quotas  to  
states based on fair criteria such as comparative GDP (Schuck, 1998, pp. 306-17;  
compare  Miller,  2005,  pp.  202-3;  Cole,  2000,  pp.  148-54).  This  idea  could  also  
be applied to economic migrants. Besides GDP, impartial criteria might include  
population density and the quality of the environmental infrastructure. On this  
view, then, states would have substantial, though varying, duties to admit out-  
siders.  No  state  would  have  a  right  to  close  its  borders,  but  nor  would  it  be  
under a duty to open them completely. Moreover, we could envisage a system  
of  tradable  quotas  for  economic  migrants,  perhaps  linked  to  states'  cosmo-  
politan  duties  of  resource  redistribution.  
 
If a decent life includes particular relationships with others, there remains the  
question of what special duties citizens owe one another. In particular, if a rich  
state fulfils its duties of cosmopolitan justice, should its citizens' desire to pre-  
serve  their  national  identity  be  a  legitimate  criterion  governing  the  ethics  of  
admission?  To  answer  this  question,  it  is  worth  distinguishing  again  between  
the  democratic  association  and  the  communitarian  arguments  for  restrictive  
admissions policies. The former appeals to the values of democracy, sovereignty  
and  collective  self-determination.  Here  Jordan  and  Düvell's  idea  of  a  network  
of overlapping political authorities is useful. We could imagine a global system  
of multilevel governance that could meet citizens' legitimate interest in demo-  
cratic sovereignty, but not situate that exclusively in the nation state (compare  
Pogge, 2002, pp. 168-95). For one thing, each state should have some input in  
governing  the  international  agency  that  determined  immigration  quotas,  as  
outlined  above.  There  remains  the  communitarian  argument  for  immigration  
restrictions.  I  have  argued  that  particular  instantiations  of  national  identity  at  
a  particular  time  lack  the  normative  authority  to  ground  reasons  for  restric-  
tions.  Nevertheless,  I  believe  citizens  do  have  special  duties  to  reﬂect  on  the  
normative value of their national identity that only they can properly perform  
(compare Moellendorf, 2002, pp. 30-50). The ideal is an 'epistemic community'  
that reﬂects on the nature of just those public relationships that citizens share  
(compare  Kostakopoulou,  2001,  pp.  101-26).  This  points  to  strengthening  of  
citizenship  virtues  among  citizens,  established  and  recently  arrived,  and  low-  
ering  barriers  to  acquiring  citizenship  to  immigrants.  But  the  ideal  of  an  epis-  
temic community by itself has few implications for numbers admitted - besides,  
perhaps,  a  bias  against  admitting  large  inﬂuxes  of  peoples  immune  from  citi-  
zenship  virtue  (Whelan,  1988,  pp.  20-2).  It  is  mainly  the  impartial  criteria  out-  
lined  earlier  that  should  govern  principles  of  admission.  
 
This  rather  compressed  outline  of  the  ethics  of  immigration  can  no  doubt  be  
contested at many points. However, I do want to claim that a normative theory  
of immigration must be embedded in a cosmopolitan view of social justice and  
must incorporate the values of democracy and sovereignty. That is no easy the-  
oretical  task,  but  the  increasing  numbers  of  migrants  across  the  world  mean  
that  arriving  at  a  normative  view  of  the  ethics  of  admission  to  inform  public  
policy  is  both  urgent  and  important.  
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Notes  
1  Migrant numbers can be measured by stocks or ﬂows. For stock purposes, they are defined by  
the UN as those residing in a new country for 12 months or more.  
2  Nett (1971), Ackerman (1980, pp. 92-5), Carens (1992), Cole (2000), Dummett (2001; 2004), Harris  
(2002), Hayter (2000), Johnson (2003) and Kukathas (2005; compare 2003, pp. 586-7).  
 
3  Gibney (1986, pp. 76-105), Perry (1995), Bader (1995, pp. 214-5; 1997, pp. 49-51), Somek (1998),  
Ghosh (2000a, p. 25; 2000b), Isbister (1996), Jordan and Düvell (2003), and Benhabib (2004).  
 
4  Walzer (1983), Rawls (1999), Meilaender (2001) and Miller (2005).  
 
5  See Walzer, 1983, pp. 48-51; Singer and Singer, 1988; Schuck, 1998, pp. 243-97; Dummett, 2001,  
pp. 22-45; Edwards, 2001; Kukathas, 2003, pp. 581-5; Gibney, 2004; Miller, 2005, pp. 202-3.  
6  Compare van Gunsteren, 1988; Bauböck, 1994; Hampton, 1995; Preuss, 1998; Carens, 2000, pp.  
212-5; Kostakopoulou, 2001, Kymlicka, 2003 and Miller, 2005, pp. 202-3.  
7  The growth of global institutions makes this claim less plausible in 2005 than it may have been  
in 1983.  
8  On  the  variety  of  social  justice  arguments  applied  to  immigration,  see  the  essays  collected  in  
Schwartz,  1995  and,  especially,  Barry  and  Goodin,  1992.  Cole  (2000,  pp.  192-205)  and  Gibney  
(1986, pp. 79-85) consider more open borders on grounds of restitutive justice, and Van Parijs  
(1993, pp. 140-52) discusses Marxism and migration, but unfortunately there is not the space  
properly to evaluate these ideas here.  
9  Simon, 1989; Ghosh, 2000b, pp. 231-3; Harris, 2002, pp. 76-124; Stalker, 2001, pp. 63-89; Johnson,  
2003, pp. 235-8; Kleinman, 2003.  
10  Gibney, 1986, p. 105; Goodin, 1992, pp. 7-8; Bader, 1997, pp. 30-8; Pogge, 1997; Moellendorf,  
2002, pp. 66-7; Tan, 2004, pp. 123-31.  
11  I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for this point.  
12  This is a precise inversion of the policy currently pursued by the EU.  
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